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SHOULD DEBTORS BE FORCED INTO
CHAPTER 13?
Eric A. Posner*
Under § 707(b) of the current bankruptcy law, a bankruptcy
court may dismiss an individual's filing under Chapter 7 if it finds
that the filing is a "substantial abuse" of the Bankruptcy Code.'
However, the Code does not define "substantial abuse," and the leg-
islative history is ambiguous. Because earlier drafts of § 707(b) re-
ferred to debtors who could pay off a good portion of their debt out
of future income, some argue that bankruptcy courts should interpret
substantial abuse to refer to the Chapter 7 filings of such debtors.
But others argue that the replacement of earlier language with the
vague substantial abuse standard means that Congress did not have
such an intention.2 In any event, dismissals of Chapter 7 cases on
grounds of substantial abuse are relatively uncommon and usually
involve objectionable behavior on the part of the debtor beyond the
use of the bankruptcy law despite the capacity to satisfy creditors out
of future income.
3
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Michelle White for
helpful comments, and to Chris Perrin for valuable research assistance and
comments.
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
2. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in In re Walton, 866 F.2d
981 (8th Cir. 1989). See generally F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4
S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 67, 69 (discussing the legislative history of § 707(b)).
3. This is the implication of DAvID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §§
7-45, 7-48 (1992); see also Wayne R. Wells et al., The Implementation of
Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 15 (1991). However, there seems to be a steadily increasing stream of §
707(b) dismissals. See Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), No. 97-5080,
1999 WL 5307 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1999); First USA v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna),
153 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146 (4th
Cir. 1996); see also Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829 (8th
Cir. 1994) (decided under § 707(a)).
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One of the most important provisions of House Bill 3150 is its
resuscitation of § 707(b). Section 102 of the bill amends § 707(b) of
the Code by requiring bankruptcy courts to dismiss cases in which
the debtor has an income above the national median income and has
a high enough expected income over five years to enable him or her
to pay off a relatively small portion of unsecured, nonpriority debt.
4
This Article describes section 102 in detail, speculates about its po-
tential effects, and evaluates it in light of the goals of bankruptcy
law.
Initially, one should note a cosmetic but telling change in the
relevant language. Currently § 707(b) requires a finding of "sub-
stantial abuse." The bill would require a finding only of "abuse."
The drafters of the bill appear to be signaling that they want § 707(b)
to be applied routinely, not only to outrageous conduct. But the sig-
nificance of the bill lies in the way that it defines abuse.
The bill contains a formula for determining whether abuse has
occurred. This formula is designed to prevent a debtor from filing
under Chapter 7 if the debtor's income exceeds the national median
income for the debtor's family size and if the debtor's expected dis-
posable income is high enough that a substantial amount of debt
could be paid off over five years. To understand the formula, let i
equal the debtor's current monthly income; e equal the debtor's
monthly expenses as defined under regulations issued by the Internal
Revenue Service; s equal the debtor's average monthly payments to
secured creditors over the next sixty months; p equal the debtor's av-
erage monthly payments to priority claimants over the next sixty
months; and c equal the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims. The
bankruptcy court shall presume that abuse occurs if:
60(i - e - s - p) __ min {.25c, $5000}. 5 The presumption can be
4. See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 102 (1998). Although this bill was not
enacted into law prior to the expiration of the 105th Congress, it appears as of
this writing that its provisions on § 707(b) are being reintroduced in the 106th
Congress as H.R. 833. See Daniel J. Pauks, Creditors Push to Revive Bank-
ruptcy Overhaul Bill with Minimal Changes, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
WEEKLY REPORT, Feb. 13, 1999, at 391. For a discussion of House Bill 3150
and means-testing, see Edith H. Jones & Todd J.
Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.house.gov/gekas/bankruptcy/jon-2yw.html>.
5. Because a motion can be brought only if the debtor's income exceeds
966
FORCED INTO CHAPTER 13
avoided under extraordinary circumstances, but the standard appears
to be high, and so we will ignore it.
The left side of the formula is an estimate of how much cash the
debtor will have over sixty months, given that the debtor must use
some portion of his or her income for ordinary expenses and for
payments to secured and other priority creditors. One might think of
this amount as the debtor's "cash cushion" or expected disposable
income over five years. When you receive your paycheck every
month, you have to pay your creditors and your ordinary expenses,
but it is useful to think of the remainder as a cushion that you might
save or spend on luxury goods.
Now observe the right side of the equation. If the debtor owes
more than $20,000 to unsecured, nonpriority creditors, then the right
side equals $5000. If the debtor owes less than $20,000, then the
right side equals one quarter of that amount. For example, if a debtor
owes $10,000 to unsecured, nonpriority creditors, the right side of
the inequality equals $2500.
To illustrate the effect of the formula on different kinds of debt-
ors, we let e = $400, s = $0, andp = $0, and vary i and c.
6
Total
Monthly Cushion Total Presumed
Income (i) (i - e - s -p) isecured abuse?
$500______ $100______ $ 06claims (c)
$500 $100 $30,000 yes: $6000 > $5000
$500 $100 $10,000 yes: $6000 >$2500
$450 $50 $30,000 no: $3000 <$5000
$450 $50 $10,000 yes: $3000 > $2500
If the debtor has a large enough cushion, filing under Chapter 7
will be deemed an abuse regardless of the size of the debt. If the
debtor has a small cushion, this filing is more likely to be deemed an
the national median income for his family size, this formula applies only to
such relatively high-income debtors. See H.R. 3150 § 102(b).
6. Of course, the numbers are only illustrative. As noted above, the for-
mula applies only if the debtor's income exceeds the median national income.
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abuse as the size of the debt declines. Put more succinctly: wealth-
ier people cannot file under Chapter 7; less wealthy people can, but
only if their debts are high enough.
People whose cases are dismissed under the new version of §
707(b) would not be without any remedy. They would be able to file
under Chapter 13 rather than under Chapter 7. Under Chapter 7 the
debtor must use all non-exempt property to pay debts, but does not
have to use money from future income. Under Chapter 13 the debtor
may sometimes keep some non-exempt property, but must pay debts
out of future income, over three to five years. For most debtors, par-
ticularly high-income debtors, Chapter 7 is the preferred choice.
Imagine a doctor who earns $500,000 per year, has $1 million in
non-exempt assets, and owes $10 million to creditors. Chapter 7 is
painful: he must pay $1 million to the creditors. But he also gets to
keep $2.5 million that he will earn over the next five years. Under
Chapter 13 he might be required to liquidate some of his non-exempt
assets and pay a good portion of the $2.5 million in future earnings.
It should be clear, however, that the new law would not apply
only to doctors and other high-income individuals. Indeed, simple
algebra shows that anybody whose cushion exceeds $83.33 per
month will be forced into Chapter 13 as long as his yearly income
exceeds the national median income for his household size. The na-
tional median income for a household with two or three children was
$50,752 in 1996.' Among higher-income debtors, only those who
have substantial secured debt or priority debt, such as child support
obligations, could avoid dismissal under § 707(b). But secured debt
is limited by the value of available assets and priority debt is a rela-
tively narrow category in the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 13 would
take Chapter 7's place as the normal form of bankruptcy for higher-
income debtors.
To understand how House Bill 3150 would affect people's be-
havior, one can divide people's bankruptcy-related behavior into
three temporal components: (1) the purchase of credit, (2) the deci-
sion to file for bankruptcy, and (3) the behavior during the pendency
of a Chapter 13 plan.
7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, Tl. No. 751 (1998).
[Vol. 32:965
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Working backwards, we start with behavior under a Chapter 13
plan. Under Chapter 13, all of a debtor's disposable income must be
used to repay debts unless the creditors consent to a more generous
plan. Thus, every dollar that the debtor might earn by working
harder will be taken by creditors, so the debtor has little incentive to
work hard. Indeed, many debtors might stop working and instead
live off their families or collect welfare benefits, because by doing so
they do no worse than they do by working and losing their entire dis-
posable income. People who refuse to work will neither pay off their
debts, nor receive a discharge; but creditors will not be paid, either.
This would not be a happy state of affairs. The bankruptcy law is
motivated in part by the fear that tough loan-forgiveness laws would
produce a class of people who would be continually dependent on
social welfare programs. Thus, one might argue that the revised §
707(b) would defeat a purpose of bankruptcy law.
However, it is not clear how serious a problem this is. It seems
reasonable to think that people with significant education and skills
will eventually want to go back to work even if they are heavily
taxed by a Chapter 13 plan. However burdensome the payments,
they can last no more than three to five years, after which the
debtor's income is free from past debts. In addition, if the disincen-
tive presents a serious problem, creditors will agree to a more gener-
ous plan that preserves the incentive to work as long as they receive
more value than they would under Chapter 7. Alternatively, Chapter
13 could be amended in order to allow the debtor to pay less than his
or her entire disposable income. 8 Finally, the people who would
have the strongest incentives not to work in Chapter 13-the rela-
tively poor-would probably be able to use Chapter 7 under section
102. In any event, creditors currently seem to believe that they
would do better in a system that made Chapter 13 routine than under
the current system, and it seems unlikely that they are seriously mis-
taken.
9
8. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
9. See Pauks, supra note 4. However, this may be because they would not
bear the full costs of default, given the existence of the social welfare system.
See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Un-
conscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Free-
dom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).
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Now consider the debtor's incentive to file for bankruptcy in a
world where section 102 has been enacted. Wealthier debtors realize
that they will be forced into Chapter 13. If section 102 is enacted, it
is likely that fewer wealthier debtors will file for bankruptcy because
they gain less by filing under Chapter 13 than they do currently by
filing under Chapter 7. Furthermore, those who do file for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 13 will pay more to creditors than those who
currently file under Chapter 7.1O
One might worry that wealthy debtors might avoid a § 707(b)
dismissal by engaging in strategic behavior. One strategy would be
to switch from a high-paying to a low-paying job before entering
bankruptcy. A doctor, for example, might give up a $200,000 salary
and take a low-paying job at a clinic operated by a charity, or even
refuse to work, claiming that he or she cannot find an adequate posi-
tion. If permitted to do this, his income would be zero. Under the
formula in section 102, his filing would not be deemed an abuse."I
However, courts can probably police this behavior easily.12 Courts
can probably also police other forms of strategic behavior that might
be motivated by section 102,13 such as substituting secured debt for
unsecured debt.
The incentives of less wealthy debtors are more complex and
interesting. As noted above, a court is less likely to find that a per-
son has committed abuse under section 102 as his total unsecured
debt increases. For example, a person with $50 monthly disposable
income engages in abuse under section 102 if his total unsecured
claims equal $10,000, but not if the total unsecured claims equal
10. A recent study of an early version of H.R. 3150 found that only 3% of a
sample of Chapter 7 debtors would be subject to section 102. See Marianne B.
Culhane & Michaela M. White, American Bankruptcy Institute, Taking the
New Consumer Bankruptcy Model For a Test Drive: Means-Testing
Real Chapter 7 Debtors, (last modified Mar. 23, 1999)
<http://www.abiworld.org/research/creightonstudy.html>. The earlier version
is stricter than the current version, so presumably, the 3% figure understates
the likely effect of the current version.
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
12. See Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d at 832 (finding
that a doctor who took a position that paid $45,000 per year could earn
$110,000 to $120,000 after expenses, and thus could pay off a substantial por-
tion of his debts).
13. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 435-37.
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$30,000. This is a natural consequence of the goal of making people
use Chapter 13 if their expected future income is substantial enough
to pay off a large portion of their current debt. But this means that a
rational person will take on more debt if he believes that he will soon
enter bankruptcy.
Imagine a debtor with a disposable income of $50 per month
and unsecured debt of $10,000. He loses his job, and realizes that he
will not be able to pay off his debts. If he files for bankruptcy, sec-
tion 102 would force him to file under Chapter 13, which would
mean that a portion of his future income would have to be used to
pay off some of his debt. If instead he borrows another $20,000 and
then files for bankruptcy after a suitable period of time has elapsed,
he will be able to file under Chapter 7 and obtain a discharge of all
his debts, which would allow him to keep his future income.
One response to this problem is to give bankruptcy judges the
authority to deny a Chapter 7 filing to people who engage in this be-
havior. But it is doubtful that bankruptcy judges would use this
authority any more eagerly than they have used their authority under
§ 707(b). Another solution is to use a constant amount in the for-
mula, like $5000, rather than the minimum of a portion of unsecured
debt and $5000.
Finally, let us consider the debtors' and creditors' incentives
prior to entering a credit contract. If, as creditors seem to believe,
the perverse incentives in the second and third stages are not too se-
rious, they will be more willing to extend loans to high-risk debtors,
and they will generally charge lower interest rates than they do under
current conditions. If debtors are relatively risk-neutral, they will be
better off under this arrangement. Risk-averse debtors may fear
taking on credit if they are not well-protected against income
shocks, 14 but in theory they can respond to this fear either by taking
on less debt or negotiating contracts with creditors that release them
from their debts if they suffer income shocks. Whether this will
happen is another question.
With these observations as background, it is important to focus
now on whether the proposal to reform § 707(b) is a good idea. The
answer to this question depends on what one thinks bankruptcy
14. See infra note 16.
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should accomplish. Although people disagree about the goals of
bankruptcy law, most people agree that one purpose of bankruptcy
law is to minimize the cost of credit, and another purpose of bank-
ruptcy law is to provide insurance against income shocks.' 5 Ac-
cordingly, I will focus on whether the proposed bill would serve ei-
ther of these purposes.
In the absence of bankruptcy law, creditors would sue the insol-
vent debtor under state law and in state courts. The creditors who
win the race to the courthouse would obtain greater value than those
who drag their feet. The debtor's assets would be liquidated piece-
meal even when those assets are worth more if liquidated as a group.
Creditors would incur costs monitoring the debtor, or simply swal-
low their losses. In either situation they would charge higher interest
rates than they would if a bankruptcy law ensured that the debtor's
assets would be sold in an organized way.
Unless the perverse incentives mentioned above are serious, the
goal of cost minimization would be advanced by the new bill be-
cause it increases the amount of assets available to creditors in case
of default and bankruptcy. By forcing more debtors into Chapter 13,
the amended § 707(b) would make a portion of debtors' future in-
come available to creditors. Because creditors would expect higher
returns in case of default, they would charge less for credit ex ante.
In addition, the bill would probably reduce costs by improving the
debtor's incentives to take risks. Currently, people who enter bank-
ruptcy lose their non-exempt assets, and the prospect of such a loss
may deter some people from engaging in risky credit transactions.
But exemption laws are fairly generous, and for many people the
value of their non-exempt assets is too low to deter them from en-
gaging in risky credit transactions. Creditors must either swallow
their losses or incur costs in monitoring debtors, and they must pass
on the costs to debtors by raising interest rates or reducing the supply
of credit. If, under the proposed law, debtors had to pay some of
their debts out of future income, they would be more reluctant to file
15. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (1986); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1987); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Per-
spective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1981); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking,
Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 188 (1984).
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for bankruptcy. 16 This means both that fewer debtors would default
and those who did default would repay a larger portion of their loans.
As a result, creditors would have lower costs, and would pass on
their savings in the form of lower interest rates.
In addition to minimizing the cost of credit, bankruptcy law pro-
vides people with insurance against income shocks. To understand
this theory, assume that a person borrows money in period 1 for the
purpose of consuming in period 1, and anticipates paying the debt
out of his or her presumably greater income in period 2. However,
there is a small probability that a shock will occur that will eliminate
all or most of the income in period 2. The person might be injured in
an accident, struck down by a serious disease, divorced by a bread-
winning spouse, compelled to care for a sick relative, or laid off by a
factory closing. If the market offered insurance against these shocks,
the person would buy that insurance in period 1. Because people are
generally risk-averse, people want to equalize their wealth over dif-
ferent states of the world. Almost all people would rather have a
100% probability of $99,000 if they are healthy and a 100% prob-
ability of $99,000 if they are sick, than a 99% probability of
$100,000 if they are healthy and a 1% probability of $0 if they are
sick. So almost all people will pay $1,000 for health and disability
insurance worth $99,000, and the market will supply such insurance
as long as the insurer can determine that the probability of illness is
less than about one in a hundred.
The market offers insurance against theft, death, and damage to
property, but it does not, for the most part, offer insurance against
loss of income. Insurance companies do not offer such contracts, nor
do creditors who might otherwise release a debtor from payment in
the case of a job loss or other calamity in return for a higher interest
rate. The reason why the market does not offer such contracts is not
entirely clear, but it is well known that insurance markets can fail
because of information problems. If a person is insured against job
16. This point is emphasized in Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for
Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy
Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CIE. L. REV. 685 (1998) [hereinafter
White, Why It Pays]. See also Hung-jen Wang & Michelle J. White, An Opti-
mal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms, (1998) (unpub-
lished working paper 98-07, University of Michigan, Dept. of Econ., on file
with Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
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loss, he or she might act carelessly at work. If an insurer cannot de-
tect such carelessness and deny coverage on the basis of it, which is
in all likelihood the case, then it could not offer employment insur-
ance except at prohibitive prices. The absence of employment insur-
ance may also result from adverse selection. As long as the insurer
cannot distinguish better and worse workers in advance, it would
have to charge a premium that reflects the average chance of being
fired. The better workers would refuse to buy insurance; the worse
workers alone would buy insurance; but this would drive the pre-
mium up to prohibitive levels.
On this view, bankruptcy law-and state property exemption
law17 generally-cures a market failure. When creditors converge on
the debtor, he or she can avoid losing all his or her property by de-
claring bankruptcy or by taking refuge under state property exemp-
tion laws.' 8 However, bankruptcy law does not allow the debtor to
keep all his or her property, either. Because the debtor loses non-
exempt assets, he or she shares some of the risk with the creditors. A
debtors will be discouraged from carelessness at work, because he or
she bears some of the loss, even if not all of the loss, as would be the
case if bankruptcy and exemption laws did not exist. Although in-
centives are not perfect, the protection of some assets but not others
creates a compromise between the goal of insurance and the goal of
minimizing careless behavior. The law in this way sensibly mimics
insurance markets, which typically insist on a deductible or co-
payment.
This still leaves us with the question of whether the bankruptcy
"deductible" should come out of current assets, future income, or
both. Chapter 7 is currently biased heavily in favor of current as-
sets.'9 A debtor in bankruptcy with exempt property worth $10,000,
non-exempt property worth $10,000, and debt worth $50,000, is-in
effect-paid insurance worth $40,000 by the bankruptcy system.
The reason is that the debtor is released from claims worth $50,000,
but must pay a "deductible" of $10,000, the non-exempt assets. But
this system can be improved by requiring the debtor to pay the
deductible out of future income as well.
17. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 955-59.
18. See id. at 993-94.
19. See White, Why It Pays, supra note 16, at 687-88.
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To see why, suppose the debtor borrows in period 1 for the pur-
pose of consumption, and expects to obtain future income in periods
2 and 3. If a shock occurs in period 2, the debtor receives no income
in that period. The debtor's non-exempt assets are assumed to be
worth $50 in period 2. Under Chapter 7, the debtor loses assets in
period 2 but is entitled to keep all income in period 3. Under Chap-
ter 13, the debtor gives up assets in period 2 and some income in pe-
riod 3. Imagine that the debtor borrows $100 at 0% interest, and will
earn either $0 or $100 in period 2, and $100 in period 3. Suppose a
shock does in fact occur in period 2. Now under Chapter 7, the
debtor pays $50 in period 2 and keeps $100 in period 3. Suppose
that under Chapter 13 the debtor pays $25 in period 2 and keeps $75
in period 3. Because the debtor is better off with $25 in period 2 and
$75 in period 3, than with $0 in period 2 and $100 in period 3, the
use of Chapter 13 makes the debtor better off without making the
creditor-who receives $50 in either case-any worse off. If we
adjust the debtor's payoff so that he or she does no worse in Chapter
13 than in Chapter 7, then the excess may be given to the creditor.
The result is that the cost of credit would be reduced ex ante.20 Both
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code-insurance and cost minimiza-
tion-would be served.
If this were the entire story, one might wonder why the revised §
707(b) is necessary. As described, both the debtor and the creditor
are made better off by the use of Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.
We would already observe plenty of Chapter 13 cases, and when we
observe Chapter 7 cases, that would mean that a conversion to
Chapter 13 would make the parties worse off. Indeed, something
like this must have been the original rationale for leaving the choice
of chapter to the debtor.
2 1
The answer to this puzzle is not difficult to find. In most bank-
ruptcy cases, very little is at stake. Creditors do not bother trying to
persuade debtors to use Chapter 13, because the costs of negotiation
20. See id. at 710-16 (discussing how a bankruptcy system that requires
some payments out of future income would reduce the incentive to file for
bankruptcy).
21. This is also accomplished when debtors reaffirm debts in bankruptcy.
By reaffirming a debt, the debtor keeps some assets, thus increasing the value
retained in period 2, while promising to pay out of future income, thus reduc-
ing the value the debtor will have in period 3.
June 1999]
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probably exceed the gains from increased repayment. Most Chapter
7 cases are not heavily contested. In addition, the bargaining surplus
that would result when Chapter 13 is superior to Chapter 7 would
usually go to the debtor, or at least be split between the debtor and
the creditor. But if property exemptions adequately insure the debtor
against income shocks, there is no reason to give him or her this ad-
ditional benefit, and if they do not, then an amendment of the prop-
erty exemption is the proper response. The value of revised § 707(b)
is that it makes the superior form of bankruptcy-Chapter 13-pre-
sumptive.
It makes sense to rationalize bankruptcy relief by requiring
higher-income debtors to pay out of future income as well as current
assets. To the extent that section 102 of House Bill 3150 succeeds in
doing this, it would reduce the cost of credit without also reducing
the amount of credit insurance available to debtors. There is the
further question of how much future income the debtor should be re-
quired to pay to creditors. If the amount is too great, debtors will re-
fuse to work in Chapter 13 or will be deterred from filing for bank-
ruptcy in the first place even when they ought to be able to obtain a
discharge. But the current system-in which the amount of future
income that must be paid to creditors is pretty much zero-is, as Mi-
chelle White has persuasively argued, neither an equitable way of
discharging debtors nor a rational way of deterring unnecessary
bankruptcy.
22
22. See White, Why It Pays, supra note 16, at 710-16; JACKSON, supra note
15, at 256-58.
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